The History of the Airborne Forward Air Controller in Vietnam

The US Department of Defense predicts that ground forces of the future will wage tomorrow’s wars by replacing large numbers of personnel and organic firepower for advanced technology and superior maneuverability. Those forces must be prepared to face an unconventional enemy who will operate in small, lethal units interspersed with the civilian population rather than facing coalition forces with massed formations. This scenario of blurred lines of battle and difficulty determining friend from foe resembles very closely what the US military faced in Vietnam.

This study will address the successes and failures of United States airborne forward air controllers (FACs), particularly in Vietnam, and whether combat lessons learned were passed from service to service or historically from conflict to conflict. The FAC mission has not significantly changed since the end of the Vietnam War, and a thorough study of operational and tactical lessons learned by those aircrew will significantly enhance today’s FACs ability to find and destroy dispersed enemy forces in a wide array of environments.

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Military-to-Military Cooperation with Vietnam

Southeast Asia is a key crossroads of the Pacific Region, and conducting military-to-military cooperation with Vietnam directly supports our vital interests in this region.

Southeast Asia is a mixture of religious and cultural dynamics. It has many natural resources, to include large oil reserves in Vietnam’s territorial waters, and potentially larger oil reserves around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. These islands have been laid claim to by six Asian nations, of which China and Vietnam are among them. Additionally, China's growing economic prowess and attempts to increase influence in Southeast Asia make her a competitor to U.S. regional interests.

The United States reestablished direct diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 1995. Since that time we have signed counter-narcotics and civil aviation agreements as well as a Bilateral Trade Agreement with them. Vietnam continues to cooperate with the emotional issue of fully accounting for U.S. missing in action from the protracted Vietnam War.

The United States must continue to develop and further our relations with Vietnam. It is in our best interest to expand in the areas of humanitarian demining, regional security through military-to-military relations and cooperation on counterterrorism, as well as expanding economic cooperation. Expanding our relationship with Vietnam will assist in providing additional stability to a region fraught with potential powder kegs of instability.

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America in Vietnam: Containment Lost

This research project examines world events leading up to United States involvement in Vietnam with the purpose of determining whether these events were instrumental in the shaping of the decision to enter the conflict.

These events include the actions of nations, governments and individuals. The period of examination is limited to the years of the first Truman and first and second Eisenhower administrations.

This research will determine whether the United States' decision to enter the war in Vietnam was to protect her vital national interests or interests so skewed by the effect that world events had on political decision making that the interests were neither national nor vital.

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Civil Defense Forces in Counterinsurgency: An Analysis

This study examines the effect of civil defense forces on a counterinsurgency campaign through a study of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group in the Republic of Vietnam. This study challenges a common U.S. Army viewpoint on counterinsurgency that conventional combat power, training a host nation’s national security forces, and expenditures on large civil reconstruction projects are the Army’s main contributions to counterinsurgency operations. This study is a chronological study that outlines the U.S. Army’s major successes and failures in the refinement of counterinsurgency doctrine. This study uses two major research strategies: (1) qualitative analysis of counterinsurgency theory and U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine of the 1960s, and (2) a chronological study of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. Further, operations are evaluated using the four major principles of counterinsurgency: unity of effort, securing the population, isolating the insurgent from sources of support, and winning the support of the population. After examining counterinsurgency theory, doctrine, and operations in the Republic of Vietnam this study reveals that civil defense forces are a decisive in defeating an insurgency when properly balanced with conventional combat power. Additionally, a civil defense force assists in regaining area control, denial of support to the insurgents, and the restoration of government authority to an area.

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Getting the Command and Control Right: A Vietnam Case Study

This study is a study of the complicated problem of command and control in modern warfare. The challenges of command and control during the Vietnam War provide the basis for the exploration of an enduring matter of concern to military professionals. The goal of achieving unity of command is inextricably linked to the creation of a clear and logical command structure. Getting the command and control right is a precept on which military professionals pride themselves. A clear command structure ultimately enables military formations to synchronize actions towards a common aim or objective. This monograph analyzes the U.S. military’s transition from advisory to offensive operations during the Vietnam War, specifically focusing on command structures and their impact on the synchronization of tactical actions. Despite an already complex situation brought about through hybrid warfare, policy-makers and senior commanders compounded the complexity of the war by establishing inadequate command arrangements. The result was a piecemeal application of military power remiss of operational coherence. This study explores the degree to which problems in command and control frustrated the synchronization of tactical actions.

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The Influence of the Catholic Church on the Eisenhower Administration's Decision to Directly Intervene in Vietnam

After World War II the United States (U.S.) struggled to counter communist expansion by establishing a world order that fostered capitalism. Key to success in the Asian-Pacific region was rebuilding the Japanese economy as a capitalist power. Toward that end, the U.S. indirectly supported the French during the First Indochina War to recolonize and take advantage of the area’s raw materials. The French failed and agreed in the Geneva Accords to partition the country with a goal of reunifying North and South Vietnam. The U.S. realized the Viet Minh would dominate and gain control of the country providing a communist victory in the region. Unwilling to accept this, the U.S. pressured Emperor Bao Dai to install Ngo Dinh Diem as Premier of South Vietnam. This was based in part on Diem and his family’s Catholic heritage, which led to pressure from leaders in the U.S. who were either Catholic or sympathetic to the Catholic Church. Ultimately, influence from the Vietnamese Catholic Church, the American Catholic Church, and the Vatican would become a factor in the foreign policy decisions by the Eisenhower Administration as they related to Vietnam. These decisions led to direct involvement in Vietnam and eventually the Vietnam War.

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Combined Action Platoons in the Vietnam War Unique Counterinsurgency Capability for the Contemporary Operating Environment

In Vietnam, the III Marine Amphibious Force used Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) as one part of its operational level counterinsurgency campaign. These platoons provided security assistance to the South Vietnamese Popular Forces and civic action to the village based population. To measure the operational effectiveness and the current relevancy of this specific type of combined action their activities are evaluated against current Army counterinsurgency doctrine. This monograph demonstrates the value of the CAPs as one element in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign, and how this form of combined action may serve as a tool for Army commanders conducting operational art in future. Independent operations are not the future of American warfare in the 21st Century. Contemporary thought about the future of American warfare is that the “conventional forces of the United States Army will have an enduring requirement to build the security forces and security ministries of other countries.” Some form of combined action will be a required in American military operations for the foreseeable future. Given this truth, CAPs provide a practical historical example of a combined action technique that can serve as a tool for the future.

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Airpower and the 1972 Easter Offensive

In the spring of 1972, North Vietnam launched a massive, three-pronged attack into South Vietnam that was eventually repulsed by South Vietnamese forces, United States (US) advisors and massive amounts of American air power. The problem is determining what factors were key to South Vietnam’s successful defense. To that point, this thesis will address the overall effectiveness of US air power in defeating North Vietnam’s attack. This paper first examines the strategic and operational environment surrounding the 1972 offensive, including the role and influence that the leaders of the US, Saigon, Hanoi, China, and the Soviet Union had on the conflict. It then shifts to the three primary tactical battles, describing each in detail, from the initial communist successes to their ultimate defeat. Finally, the analysis focuses specifically on air-power's role, from the massive strategic deployment that doubled the available assets in theater in just over a month, to its operational success striking targets in North Vietnam, to its tactical successes on the various battlefields of South Vietnam. Ultimately, this analysis determines that US air power, with US advisors playing a critical enabling role, was the decisive element in the defeat of North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive.

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The Vietnam Cauldron Defense Intelligence in the War for Southeast Asia

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was the first new agency established by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara after he assumed office in 1961. The ambitious McNamara intended to reformulate U.S. strategic nuclear policy and reduce inefficiencies that had developed in the Department of Defense (DoD) in the 1950s. DIA was the lynchpin to both efforts. In the early and middle 1960s, McNamara and his subordinates, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and new DIA Director Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll (USAF), worked hard to establish the Agency, but their efforts were delayed or stymied by intransigent and parochial military leadership who objected to the creation of DIA because they feared a loss of both battlefield effectiveness and political influence in Washington, D.C.

The work of building the DIA was made all the more urgent by the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia. By the early 1960s, millions of dollars and hundreds of advisory personnel sent by the U.S. were having a negligible impact on the anti-communist campaign there. As the U.S. continued to commit more resources to the ill-fated government in Saigon, the country found itself drawn deeper and deeper into the maelstrom.

For DIA, the looming war in Southeast Asia would expose major problems in its organization and performance. Especially in the period from 1961 to 1969, DIA, either because of structural weaknesses or leadership failures, often failed to energetically seize opportunities to assert itself in the major intelligence questions involving the conflict there. This tendency was exacerbated by national military leadership’s predilection for ignoring or undercutting the Agency’s authority. In turn, this opened up DIA to severe criticism by Congress and other national policymakers, some of whom even considered abolishing the Agency. During the war, McNamara’s great hope for reforming military intelligence would be swept up in quarrels between powerful domestic adversaries, and DIA’s performance left the Secretary of Defense deeply embittered toward his creation. It was only at the end of the war that DIA assumed a more influential role in Southeast Asia. Until then, however, the Agency was consigned to the wilderness when it came to questions about the Vietnam conflict.

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U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954

This portion of the study treats U.S. policy towards the war in Indochina from the U.S. decision to recognize the Vietnamese Nationalist regime of the Emperor Bao Dai in February, 1950, through the U.S. deliberations on military intervention in late 1953 and early 1954. Section A examines the triangular relationship of France, the U.S., and the Bao Dai regime. Section B analyzes the intervention issue, and the antecedents to the Geneva Conference.

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Schweinfurt Raids and the Pause in Daylight Strategic Bombing

This study examines the daylight strategic bombing doctrine before and after the Schweinfurt raids to answer the question “After the costly Schweinfurt raids, the Eighth AAF paused to reset its doctrine; how was this doctrinal change accepted and what were the implications?” Initially, the heavy losses incurred during the August Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid were explained away as justified due to the “heavy” damage to both targets, the number of German fighters “shot down,” and the weather which prevented 300 heavy bombers from being sent as one force - the number required for self-sustainment on deep penetration missions. This was the same mood immediately after the October Schweinfurt raid but changed drastically once monthly loss statistics were released and further examination forced the USAAF leadership into a rude awakening: unescorted bombers took seven times the loss plus two-and-a-half times the damage and the final assessment revealed Eighth Bomber Command experienced the loss of one-third of its heavy bombers each month. The upper levels of the USAAF leadership initially had difficulty accepting what the lower level leaders and aircrew knew: unescorted daylight strategic bombing was not practical in the face of determined opposition.

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