This
study examines the effect of civil defense forces on a
counterinsurgency campaign through a study of the Civilian Irregular
Defense Group in the Republic of Vietnam. This study challenges a common
U.S. Army viewpoint on counterinsurgency that conventional combat
power, training a host nation’s national security forces, and
expenditures on large civil reconstruction projects are the Army’s main
contributions to counterinsurgency operations. This study is a
chronological study that outlines the U.S. Army’s major successes and
failures in the refinement of counterinsurgency doctrine. This study
uses two major research strategies: (1) qualitative analysis of
counterinsurgency theory and U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine of the
1960s, and (2) a chronological study of the Civilian Irregular Defense
Group. Further, operations are evaluated using the four major principles
of counterinsurgency: unity of effort, securing the population,
isolating the insurgent from sources of support, and winning the support
of the population. After examining counterinsurgency theory, doctrine,
and operations in the Republic of Vietnam this study reveals that civil
defense forces are a decisive in defeating an insurgency when properly
balanced with conventional combat power. Additionally, a civil defense
force assists in regaining area control, denial of support to the
insurgents, and the restoration of government authority to an area.
OBTAIN DOCUMENT: Civil Defense Forces in Counterinsurgency: An Analysis
