This
study examines the daylight strategic bombing doctrine before and after
the Schweinfurt raids to answer the question “After the costly
Schweinfurt raids, the Eighth AAF paused to reset its doctrine; how was
this doctrinal change accepted and what were the implications?”
Initially, the heavy losses incurred during the August
Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid were explained away as justified due to the
“heavy” damage to both targets, the number of German fighters “shot
down,” and the weather which prevented 300 heavy bombers from being sent
as one force - the number required for self-sustainment on deep
penetration missions. This was the same mood immediately after the
October Schweinfurt raid but changed drastically once monthly loss
statistics were released and further examination forced the USAAF
leadership into a rude awakening: unescorted bombers took seven times
the loss plus two-and-a-half times the damage and the final assessment
revealed Eighth Bomber Command experienced the loss of one-third of its
heavy bombers each month. The upper levels of the USAAF leadership
initially had difficulty accepting what the lower level leaders and
aircrew knew: unescorted daylight strategic bombing was not practical in
the face of determined opposition.
OBTAIN DOCUMENT: Schweinfurt Raids and the Pause in Daylight Strategic Bombing
