In recent years, China has been flexing its military power
and strengthening its claim to the resource-rich Spratly and Paracel Islands in
the South China Sea. These islands are also being claimed by five other
countries: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Currently
China claims the entire South China Sea as its territorial waters. The U.S. has
great interest in this issue because its trade routes with the Asia-Pacific
region go through the South China Sea. Throughout history, Vietnam and China
have had a contentious relationship. Like China, Vietnam is currently
modernizing its military and strengthening its claims to the South China Sea.
Of the claimants to the South China Sea, Vietnam seems to be the only country
that is willing to challenge Chinese assertiveness in the region.
Since the normalization of relations between the United
States and Vietnam, the two former enemies have become important trading
partners. The United States and Vietnam are conducting yearly high-level
military visits; however, the U.S. wants to take this relationship to the next
level. This thesis will apply game theory and analyze whether the U.S. can
influence Vietnam to open a more formal military relationship to counterbalance
the assertiveness of China in the South China Sea. This thesis concludes that,
from a game theoretic Strategic Moves perspective, the U.S. currently cannot apply
threats, promises, or a combination thereof to compel or coerce Vietnam toward
a more formal military alliance to counterbalance the assertiveness of China in
the South China Sea.
