This monograph proposes that the United States Armed Forces
consistently followed a strategy of attrition from the introduction of
battalion sized combat troops in 1965, through the Westmoreland-Abrams
transition, and ultimately encouraged the South Vietnamese to follow this
strategy during the period of Vietnamization. General Abrams promoted a
“one-war” strategy which had the desired end state of population security for
the people of South Vietnam. In reality the “one-war” was a multi-tiered
strategy of attrition. The training of South Vietnamese forces was predicated
on their capability to conduct attrition warfare upon the departure of American
forces. This monograph emphasizes the continuity of American strategy in the
Republic of South Vietnam. Despite claims of a radical shift to
counter-insurgency and pacification operations, General Abrams continued a
consistent strategy he inherited from his predecessor; in turn he passed it on
to the South Vietnamese. Any limited success achieved by the United States
Armed Forces in South Vietnam was a result of attrition not counter-insurgency
and that the ultimate failure was the inability to transition from attrition to
maneuver.
OBTAIN DOCUMENT: General Creighton Abram and the Operational Approach of Attrition in the Vietnam War
