Military Assistance Advisory Group-Vietnam (1954-1963) The Battle of Ap Bac

The performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) at the Battle of Ap Bac, January 2, 1963, established a narrative that the South Vietnamese were unwilling to fight or lacked aggressiveness. At the time of the Battle of Ap Bac, the South Vietnamese had been receiving direct military aid from the US and under the tutelage of American advisors for over eight years. Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann was the senior U.S. Army advisor present and remarked after the battle, "It was a miserable damn performance, just like it always is. These people won't listen. They make the same mistake over and over again in the same way.” In the context of those comments, ARVN did not show an appreciable increase in combat effectiveness with years of direct American support. The larger narrative surrounding the battle indicates that the performance of ARVN was a harbinger for future challenges and setbacks in South Vietnam. This battle and subsequent evaluation of the ARVN attribute the cause for combat ineffectiveness was the South Vietnamese lacking leadership and not possessing the necessary fighting spirit. Is the evaluation that the outcome of the Battle of Ap Bac hinged on the lack of competent and aggressive ARVN officers still valid when put in the broader cultural, social, and political context that existed at its birth?


OBTAIN DOCUMENT:  Military Assistance Advisory Group-Vietnam (1954-1963) The Battle of Ap Bac

Operation Sealords: A Front in a Frontless War, An Analysis of the Brown-Water Navy in Vietnam

This book examines Operation SEALORDS, the capstone campaign conducted by the Brown-Water Navy in Vietnam. Specifically, this paper addresses the primary question: Was the SEALORDS campaign successful, and if so, what lessons, can be learned from SEALORDS and how might we employ brown-water forces in the future?

This book breaks down the SEALORDS campaign into three areas of study. First, the study examines the barrier interdiction portion of the campaign designed to stem the flow of enemy infiltration of men and material from Cambodia into the Mekong Delta. Second, this study analyzes the Denial of Sanctuary Operations and Pacification portion of the SEALORDS operations. Lastly, the Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese Program known as "ACTOV" is examined to determine its effectiveness.

The Findings of this book suggest that by concentrating naval forces athwart the major infiltration routes along the Cambodian border, SEALORDS effectively cut enemy lines of communication into South Vietnam and severly restricted enemy attempts at infiltration. Additionally, the findings suggest that SEALORDS contributed significantly to pacification efforts in the southern part of III Corps and all of the TV Corps Tactical Zone. Finally, the ACTOV Program is evaluated as successful and put the navy out ahead of the other services with respect to Vietnamization of the war effort.

OBTAIN DOCUMENT: Operation Sealords: A Front in a Frontless War, An Analysis of the Brown-Water Navy in Vietnam

General Creighton Abram and the Operational Approach of Attrition in the Vietnam War

This monograph proposes that the United States Armed Forces consistently followed a strategy of attrition from the introduction of battalion sized combat troops in 1965, through the Westmoreland-Abrams transition, and ultimately encouraged the South Vietnamese to follow this strategy during the period of Vietnamization. General Abrams promoted a “one-war” strategy which had the desired end state of population security for the people of South Vietnam. In reality the “one-war” was a multi-tiered strategy of attrition. The training of South Vietnamese forces was predicated on their capability to conduct attrition warfare upon the departure of American forces. This monograph emphasizes the continuity of American strategy in the Republic of South Vietnam. Despite claims of a radical shift to counter-insurgency and pacification operations, General Abrams continued a consistent strategy he inherited from his predecessor; in turn he passed it on to the South Vietnamese. Any limited success achieved by the United States Armed Forces in South Vietnam was a result of attrition not counter-insurgency and that the ultimate failure was the inability to transition from attrition to maneuver.

 OBTAIN DOCUMENT: General Creighton Abram and the Operational Approach of Attrition in the Vietnam War

U.S.- Vietnam Military Relations: Game Theory Perspective

In recent years, China has been flexing its military power and strengthening its claim to the resource-rich Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. These islands are also being claimed by five other countries: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Currently China claims the entire South China Sea as its territorial waters. The U.S. has great interest in this issue because its trade routes with the Asia-Pacific region go through the South China Sea. Throughout history, Vietnam and China have had a contentious relationship. Like China, Vietnam is currently modernizing its military and strengthening its claims to the South China Sea. Of the claimants to the South China Sea, Vietnam seems to be the only country that is willing to challenge Chinese assertiveness in the region.

Since the normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam, the two former enemies have become important trading partners. The United States and Vietnam are conducting yearly high-level military visits; however, the U.S. wants to take this relationship to the next level. This thesis will apply game theory and analyze whether the U.S. can influence Vietnam to open a more formal military relationship to counterbalance the assertiveness of China in the South China Sea. This thesis concludes that, from a game theoretic Strategic Moves perspective, the U.S. currently cannot apply threats, promises, or a combination thereof to compel or coerce Vietnam toward a more formal military alliance to counterbalance the assertiveness of China in the South China Sea.

OBTAIN DOCUMENT: U.S. - Vietnam Military Relations Game Theory Perspective

The Misuse of the Studies and Observation Group as a National Asset in Vietnam

The primary question this thesis aims to answer is--did the Studies and Observation Group (SOG) covert and clandestine operations contribute significantly to the Vietnam War effort? The scope of research is an examination of SOG operations throughout the war. To determine SOG’s contributions, research will answer the following secondary and tertiary questions: (1) What were the US strategic, operational, and tactical goals for Vietnam and how did they develop? (2) Did SOG contribute to the accomplishment of strategic, operational, and tactical goals in the Vietnam War? and (3) How did SOG missions affect enemy forces and their operations?

By answering the primary, secondary, and tertiary questions, a conclusion may be drawn concerning the contributions of SOG in Vietnam as the primary headquarters for carrying out the unconventional war effort against the North Vietnamese. Lessons learned may apply to the use of similar unconventional warfare assets in the Global War on Terrorism.

OBTAIN DOCUMENT: The Misuse of the Studies and Observation Group as a National Asset in Vietnam