In the spring of 1972, North Vietnam launched a massive, three-pronged
attack into South Vietnam that was eventually repulsed by South
Vietnamese forces, United States (US) advisors and massive amounts of
American air power. The problem is determining what factors were key to
South Vietnam’s successful defense. To that point, this thesis will
address the overall effectiveness of US air power in defeating North
Vietnam’s attack. This paper first examines the strategic and
operational environment surrounding the 1972 offensive, including the
role and influence that the leaders of the US, Saigon, Hanoi, China, and
the Soviet Union had on the conflict. It then shifts to the three
primary tactical battles, describing each in detail, from the initial
communist successes to their ultimate defeat. Finally, the analysis
focuses specifically on air-power's role, from the massive strategic
deployment that doubled the available assets in theater in just over a
month, to its operational success striking targets in North Vietnam, to
its tactical successes on the various battlefields of South Vietnam.
Ultimately, this analysis determines that US air power, with US advisors
playing a critical enabling role, was the decisive element in the defeat
of North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive.
OBTAIN DOCUMENT: Airpower and the 1972 Easter Offensive
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Monday, January 27, 2014
Sunday, January 5, 2014
The Vietnam Cauldron Defense Intelligence in the War for Southeast Asia
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was the first
new agency established by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara after he
assumed office in 1961. The ambitious McNamara intended to reformulate
U.S. strategic nuclear policy and reduce inefficiencies that had
developed in the Department of Defense (DoD) in the 1950s. DIA was the
lynchpin to both efforts. In the early and middle 1960s, McNamara and
his subordinates, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and new
DIA Director Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll (USAF), worked hard to
establish the Agency, but their efforts were delayed or stymied by
intransigent and parochial military leadership who objected to the
creation of DIA because they feared a loss of both battlefield
effectiveness and political influence in Washington, D.C.
The work of building the DIA was made all the more
urgent by the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia. By the early
1960s, millions of dollars and hundreds of advisory personnel sent by
the U.S. were having a negligible impact on the anti-communist campaign
there. As the U.S. continued to commit more resources to the ill-fated
government in Saigon, the country found itself drawn deeper and deeper
into the maelstrom.
For DIA, the looming war in Southeast Asia would
expose major problems in its organization and performance. Especially in
the period from 1961 to 1969, DIA, either because of structural
weaknesses or leadership failures, often failed to energetically seize
opportunities to assert itself in the major intelligence questions
involving the conflict there. This tendency was exacerbated by national
military leadership’s predilection for ignoring or undercutting the
Agency’s authority. In turn, this opened up DIA to severe criticism by
Congress and other national policymakers, some of whom even considered
abolishing the Agency. During the war, McNamara’s great hope for
reforming military intelligence would be swept up in quarrels between
powerful domestic adversaries, and DIA’s performance left the Secretary
of Defense deeply embittered toward his creation. It was only at the end
of the war that DIA assumed a more influential role in Southeast Asia.
Until then, however, the Agency was consigned to the wilderness when it
came to questions about the Vietnam conflict.
OBTAIN DOCUMENT: The Vietnam Cauldron Defense Intelligence in the War for Southeast Asia
U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954
This
portion of the study treats U.S. policy towards the war in Indochina
from the U.S. decision to recognize the Vietnamese Nationalist regime of
the Emperor Bao Dai in February, 1950, through the U.S. deliberations
on military intervention in late 1953 and early 1954. Section A examines
the triangular relationship of France, the U.S., and the Bao Dai
regime. Section B analyzes the intervention issue, and the antecedents
to the Geneva Conference.
OBTAIN DOCUMENT: U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954
OBTAIN DOCUMENT: U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954
Schweinfurt Raids and the Pause in Daylight Strategic Bombing
This
study examines the daylight strategic bombing doctrine before and after
the Schweinfurt raids to answer the question “After the costly
Schweinfurt raids, the Eighth AAF paused to reset its doctrine; how was
this doctrinal change accepted and what were the implications?”
Initially, the heavy losses incurred during the August
Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid were explained away as justified due to the
“heavy” damage to both targets, the number of German fighters “shot
down,” and the weather which prevented 300 heavy bombers from being sent
as one force - the number required for self-sustainment on deep
penetration missions. This was the same mood immediately after the
October Schweinfurt raid but changed drastically once monthly loss
statistics were released and further examination forced the USAAF
leadership into a rude awakening: unescorted bombers took seven times
the loss plus two-and-a-half times the damage and the final assessment
revealed Eighth Bomber Command experienced the loss of one-third of its
heavy bombers each month. The upper levels of the USAAF leadership
initially had difficulty accepting what the lower level leaders and
aircrew knew: unescorted daylight strategic bombing was not practical in
the face of determined opposition.
OBTAIN DOCUMENT: Schweinfurt Raids and the Pause in Daylight Strategic Bombing
OBTAIN DOCUMENT: Schweinfurt Raids and the Pause in Daylight Strategic Bombing
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